Service has been very closely engaged during the last five years. At the same time I would point out that this subject is so vast and so important that it will be impossible for me to do more, in the brief time. at my disposal, than deal very superficially with the question. Some fourteen years ago I had the honour of reading a paper on this subject at the Royal United Service Institute, and a few weeks ago, when sorting a mass of old documents, I came across a copy of this paper, the existence of which I had almost forgotten. On re-reading it I noticed that at the commencement of that paper I said: " The future success of an army in the field must, and will, to an enormous extent, depend on the efficiency with which, measures for the prevention of disease are carried out." In the light of our present day knowledge and experience we might think that that statement was a truism which it was quite needless to state, but I would remind you that fourteen years ago it was by no means so generally accepted ag it is now. Matters have changed greatly for the better since then, and I believe that it is 'At a meeting of the Section, held December 8, 1919. D-d tUar Zection, largely owing to the unceasing and unwearying efforts in the direction of education and training in army hygiene for the ten years preceding the war that our success has resulted. I propose to review, very briefly, some of the various communicable diseases which have threatened our Armies in the recent war, and the means which have been adopted towards meeting them.
THE TYPHOID GROUP OF DISEASES.
This group has, of course, always engaged our very close attention.
When we consider the history of past wars, we nmay easily realize that the typhoid group of diseases must always loom in the foreground as an ever-present danger, a possible factor for great evil, if not, indeed, for failure and disaster.
The following are a. few statistics regarding enteric fever in former wars:-Franco-German War.-German Army: 72,393 cases of enteric, with 6,965 deaths. Number of German troops which crossed the frontier was 1,146,000.
Russo-Turkish War.-Army of the Caucasus: 24,475 cases and 8,900 deaths in a strength of 246,000.
Spanish-American War in Cuba.-Americans: 20,738 cases, with 1,810 deaths, in a strength of 107,973. Admissions 88'5 per 1,000 in 1898.
Boer War.-British Forces: 57,684 cases, with 8,022 deaths. Total strength, 530,000; average strength, 208,226. Russo-Japanese War.-17,033 cases on the Russian side. French Operations in Tunis.-4,200 cases, with 1,039 deaths, in a strength of 20,000.
These are grievous and alarming statistics. Now let us consider a few figures regarding the recent war. Firstly, as regards the French army:-
Cases Deatlis
First three months of the war ...
., 8,191 ... 3,076 November 1, 1914 , to October 31, 1915 ... 87,618 ... 8,614 November 1, 1915 , to October 31, 1916 Inoculation was not made compulsory in the French Army until March 28, 1914 , and only about 125,000 men had been inoculated at the time of mobilization. If incidence and mortality had remained what they were at the end of 1914 the number of cases would have exceeded 1,000,000 and deaths 145,000. Now, as regards the British Armies in France. From the commencement of the war until December 31, 1918, we had 7,423 cases, with 266 deaths, in an average strength of 1,200,000.
I think you will agree with me that these are satisfactory figures, and show 'a very great improvement over those of any previous campaign. If you ask me to what I ascribe this improvement I would reply that, in my opinion, it is due to the advance of our scientific knowledge regarding this and kindred diseases, to the immense strides which have been made regarding water purification, disposal of waste products and field sanitation generally, to the improved education in hygiene of the Army as a whole, and last, but not least, to the increase in preventive inoculation.
As regards typhoid and para-typhoid vaccine, during the five years of the war 25,068,271 c.c. of vaccine were issued. We owe a deep debt of gratitude to the Inoculation Department of St. Mary's Hospital, which, during the first six months of the war supplied us with 11 million c.c. of typhoid vaccine.
I said just now that our knowledge and our methods had advanced during recent.years. I think that one index to this advance is furnished by the fact that the vaccine department of our Royal Army Medical College-a college which only came into existence after the South African War--has made and issued during the last five years enormous quantities of vaccines, of which I might'mention the following: There are some things, however, the value of which cannot be expressed by figures or statistics, and yet which have a power and produce an effect which are beyond calculation, and amongst these I would say that I believe that the instruction of our officers in hygiene and pathology, which has been carried out at the Royal Army Medical College since its institution has had an effect throughout the whole Army which has been of incalculable, though possibly intangible value.
You may notice that I have not made reference to the comparative ratio between deaths from disease and deaths from wounds. As you know, in previous campaigns the deaths from disease have enormously preponderated, but I have purposely omitted to mention the com-parative ratios in the recent 'war-satisfactory though these are from a hygienic standpoint-because I think that perhaps we might be prone to fail to realize the enormous influence which has been exercised by modern weapons of warfare in raising the ratio of deaths from wounds as compared with deaths from disease.
Dysentery.
We know from our histories of previous campaigns that this disease has always been a scourge of armies in the field, and has also been a danger to civilian populations owing to the distribution of infection by "carriers" of the disease. Epidemics have usually occurred in association with rapid and widespread movements of troops. In the recent war it has occurred on different army fronts during periods of great military activity, and when troops first came in contact with defective sanitation amongst Eastern populations.
The disease first made its appearance in France in 1916, and the greatest incidence occurred in August and September of the years 1916, 1917 and 1918. Elaborate arrangements were made for early and accurate diagnosis. Specialist pathologists and well equipped laboratories were established, and arrangements were made for treatment at certain dysentery' centres by specially qualified officers. All suspected cases were at once taken out of the line and kept under observation. As regards preventive measures, I may sum them up as follows (1) Precise diagnosis.
(2) Control of cases and " carriers."
(3) Isolation of all suspects.
(4) Careful sanitary supervision and control.
(5) Care of food supplies and food handling. (6) Education as to personal cleanliness. In the future I hope that we may add inoculation. In the United Kingdom we have endeavoured to protect the civil population by the provision of special hospitals, laboratories, pathologists and clinicians for the diagnosis, control and treatment of all cases and carriers arriving in this country. I think we may regard the above measures as efficacious when we consider the fact that we had only 132 deaths (the great majority of which occurred in those suffering from a Shiga infection) from the disease in France; while as regards this country although we have historic evidence of epidemics associated with the return of infected soldiers from seats of war, and although in the present instance the return of cases and carriers is beyond all previous record, yet there have only been one or two isolated domestic occurrences of the disease which might be attributed to imported infection.
Malaria.
As in previous wars, so in our recent campaigns, malaria has proved to be a terrible source of loss of strength to our Armies. Consider the extensive and long-occupied army fronts of Macedonia, Palestine, Mesopotamia, East Africa, Egypt and Italy during the years 1915 to 1918, and you will realize, as the medical authorities did, the inevitable results of campaigning in those areas for at least six months of the year. During those months changes of area of occupation meant rapid and continuous, and, in some areas, massive infection owing to continued exposure to the bites of mosquitoes.
Measures of Control in the Field.-The problems of quinine production, supply and distribution were controlled by international committees, and, in spite of the enormous demand, distribution was so well controlled that almost at no time on any front did serious shortage occur. Specialists in malaria were provided, and laboratories for diagnosis and research, special hospitals, camps and bases-e.g., at Malta, to which cases might be removed and treated efficiently without the chance of continued infection. One can hardly do more than enumerate some of the many measures which were undertaken in order to combat the incidence of this disease. Screened buildings in mosquitoinfested areas, mosquito nets for tents, hospitals and billets, veils and netting to protect the soldiers when exposed on duty, culicifuges, ointments, lotions, &c. All these measures demanded initiation, administration and execution to an extent never before called for. Sanitary operations were conducted continuously, swamps were drained, streams and ditches drained, channelled and oiled; isolation and screening of native populations in villages in proximity to camps were undertaken, and the people as well as the soldiers were educated in the facts as to the causes and prevention of malaria.
We have certainly vastly increased our knowledge as to the varieties and habits of mosquitoes in different parts of the world as well as of conditions of temperature and other influences affecting the occurrence and malignancy of malaria. From the end of 1916 to the present time cases of malaria, potentially infective, have been returning to this country, and measures were taken to protect the civilian population and to prevent indigenous infection amongst our troops. Cousultants in malaria, with appropriate staffs, were appointed to ensure adequate measures and efficient control. Special hospitals, with experienced medical officers, were established for malaria cases. In conjunction with the Local Government Board, measures of defence in camps were undertaken by the military authorities with a view to preventing the spread of infection to'the civil population, especially in such areas as had been notoriously subject to ague or malaria in the past. Concentration camps were established in order to increase control and treatment, to'limit the distribution of infective cases and to ensure that adequate treatment was given over a certain period. I think that our information to date warrants our saying that there has been a creditably small infection in this country, smaller than had been anticipated, and I believe that the continuance for the next year or two of this preventive work will prevent any serious outbreak of malaria in England.
Time does not permit me to enter into a discussion of cholera, typhus, plague, tetanus. or other diseases with which we have had to deal, suffice it to say that each one has appeared on the horizon, has threatened ominously, has .been met and, I believe, has been combated satisfactorily.
FOOD AND CLOTHING.
One of the main objects for which the Army Medical Service exists is in order that an army may be maintained in such condition that it may successfully gain ascendancy over the enemy. Of the actual fighting qualities of our Army I shall say nothing, they are well known to all of you, but the greatest optimist could not expect an army to retain its fighting capabilities if it were decimated by disease. It consequently behoves us to see that our Army is 'adequately protected.
An army, if it is to remain an efficient fighting force, must be properly clothed, well fed, supplied with pure water, and protected from disease. As to feeding and clothing, I can only say that I do not believe that ever, in the history of the world, has an army been so well fed and so well clothed as our Army has been during the recent war, and I would ask you to bear in mind that it has been fighting in every variety of climate, from the tropics to the sub-arctic regions, and under every possible condition. For this feeding and clothing we have to thank the Quartermaster-General's Department, with which the medical directorate is in the closest touch on all these questions. PREVENTIVE MEASURES AND DISCIPLINE. Now, as to the measures which are necessary for the prevention of disease, here I find myself confronted with such a colossal subject that I feel I can hardly enter upon it. I could talk for hours on the measures which have been adopted during the recent war for the ensurement of adequate conservancy, for the provision of a pure water supply, for the inoculation of troops against enteric, cholera, -plague, &c., for the action taken to meet tetanus and gas gangrene, both of which seriously threatened us at various times, but I feel that, in the limited time, I cannot attempt to enter into details, but must confine myself to the broader aspects of the question.
There are two great principles which, to my mind, underlie and govern disease prevention in the Army, and these are discipline and education. A short time ago I was reading Ludendorff's "Memoirs." He says: "Discipline is the only basis on which an army can be trained for war; discipline is not intended to kill character but to develop it. The purpose of discipline is to bring about uniformity in co-operating for a common goal." Quite so, but discipline will be immensely facilitated and strengthened if officers and men are so educated and instructed as to understand the reason of measures which are ordered to be carried out, the "why and wherefore" of those hygienic recommendations which are insisted upon by the medical authorities. I apologize for again quoting from my lecture of many years ago as follows: " While fully recognizing that it is the duty of medical officers to make recommendations, and to do all in their power to ensure that every possible measure for the prevention of disease is carried out, I would point out that, unless regimental and staff officers are in sympathy with such recommendations, and unless both they and also the non-commissioned officers and men under them, understand the reason of the preventive measures, recognize their importance, and endeavour efficiently and intelligently to carry them out, it is extremely improbable that a successful result will be obtained."
THE REGIMENTAL MEDICAL OFFICER.
I still hold that view, and consequently I am convinced that we must persistently, unceasingly and unwearyingly carry on the work of educating all ranks of the Army in this most -important subject.
Goodwin: Prevention of Disea8e on Active Service
There must be mutual understanding and co-operation, we medical men must understand the difficulties and exigencies of active service and the. military necessities of every campaign, and we must be able to show that our recommendations and measures are sound and practical, and that they will conduce to the efficiency of the Army and to the final successful outcome of the war. This must be done, not only by the heads at the War Office, but also by every medical officer in the force; each individual must be constantly thinking, striving and educating. I have, I am sorry to say, heard it said that a regimental medical officer had an idle life; I have even heard it said that his work did not occupy him for more than an hour or so daily. Regarding this, I cannot do better than quote Sir Wilmot Herringham who, in his book, " A Physician in France," says: " I have heard that some regimental medical officers complained that their work took them only half an hour a day, and others that it was not important enough to require a qualified doctor. I have no hesitation whatever in saying that such officers did not know or do their duty." I entirely and absolutely agree with Sir Wilmot, and most cordially endorse his dictum. I think I may speak as one having knowledge for I have myself been " through the mill" and have in my younger days been a regimental medical officer on active service. In later years, when inspecting medical arrangements, I have been very much impressed with the varying qualities of regimental medical officers. To take one example, which is I am glad to say typical of the majority-the regiment is in good form, the medical officer is popular, he is consulted by everyone from the Colonel downwards, the inoculation percentage is very high, thesick rate is very low, all sanitary recommendations are carried out, conservancy is as nearly as possible perfect.
Ask this medical officer if he finds his life idle, and he will reply " No, the day is not long enough to get through the work." Now take the exceptional case, that of the medical officer who finishes his work in half an hour. Ask a dozen questions-" What is your enteric inoculation percentage?" "What have you done in the way of training your regimental sanitary detachment?" "How is your water purified ?" " What teaching are you carrying out to officers and men regarding disease prevention ? " Then go around the regimental lines, visit the kitchens, dining rooms or tents, the conservancy arrangements, &c., and I should be very much astonished if, at the end of a couple of hours, that regimental medical officer was not extremely crest-fallen, extremely conscious of his shortcomings in the past, and extremely anxious to make amends in the future. THE SOLDIER AND HIS HEALTH.
My experience of the British soldier is that he is very anxious to learn, and always ready to take an intelligent interest in the why and wherefore of all rules concerning his health. He may not be able fully to grasp scientific details, but if he even understands main principles something has been accomplished. I remember many years ago a medical officer gave a lecture on the prevention of enteric fever to a roomful of non-commissioned officers and men. A general officer happened to come round; he was greatly interested and, on the conclusion of the lecture, he said: "Now I want to see if the men understand what you have told them, so I shall call a man up on the platform to tell us what he has learned." The General looked around the audience and every man endeavoured to avoid catching his eye.
One unlucky wight was, however, selected, and unwillingly mounted the platform. After considerable throat-clearing and hesitation he said: " Well, there's things called germs, they live in water and other places, and these 'ere flies carries them about and spits them on your food. If you get one of those germs inside you you're a 'case,' and if you get more than one it's likely you'll be for the box, so you've got to look out." This caused a good deal of amusement but, personally, I think that the man, who had probably never heard a lecture of the sort before, had grasped a good deal of valuable knowledge and had expressed it very pithily.
A TRIBUTE TO CIVIL HEALTH OFFICIALS.
I cannot over-emphasize the importpnce of education in hygiene, not only in the Army, but also in the civil community, and I should like here to pay a tribute to the many members of the civil Public Health Service who held commissions in the R.A.M.C. during the War. As far as possible they were employed in the Sanitary Service of the Army at home and overseas. In almost every case the post of D.A.D.M.S (Sanitation) at Army Headquarters was filled by one of their number, others of them were posted as sanitary staff officers for the important health duties at bases and ports. Many of them were detailed as bacteriologists to hospitals, others were in charge of base or those invaluable units the mobile laboratories, others again were posted to fever hospitals or to control and supervise water supplies. Perhaps they were most in evidence as officers commanding sanitary sections.
Both in the early days of the war when attached to divisions, and later when allocated to fixed areas, these sections were appreciated by all arms of the Service who realized how muich their work contributed to the health, comfort and well-being of the whole Army. Not only most of the officers, but a large percentage of the non-commissioned officers and men of these sections were drawn from the staffs of municipal health departments, and undoubtedly by precept and practice they did much to create a real sanitary conscience among the troops. Indeed it is reported that demobilized soldiers are taking back into civil life the lessons taught by sanitary sections and that some of the ingenious devices of army sanitation have been introduced into villages and small communities with excellent results. The example of the sanitary sections was not the only educational influence of civil health officials on military hygiene. Each army had its school of. sanitation with a civil health official as O.C., and with sanitary engineers, sanitary inspectors and craftsmen as instructors. To these schools were sent for courses in army sanitation the medical officers of units, combatant officers, non-commissioned officers and other ranks, so that the effect of the teaching reached every formation in the War Zone. In connexion with the schools were exhibitions where could be seen models of every sort of device for securing efficient sanitation in the area where that particular army was operating. Also attached to the schools were workshops where men detailed from units were quickly taught simple methods for the construction of fly-proof latrines, meat safes, urinals, ablution benches, incinerators and other appliances for camp, trench and billet.
It should be remembered in connexion with these schools that each had to adapt its teaching to the special requirements of the country where it was established. thus, methods suitable for France and Flanders might be ineffective in Salonica, Gallipoli, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Egypt or in East Africa, where the conditions were so very different. Some of the civil health officials held diplomas in tropical hygiene, but others without that qualification were quick to adapt their methods to meet the special problems to be dealt with, whether in South Eastern Europe, Asia or Africa. The resource that overcame the difficulties of tropical conditions was equally in evidence in dealing with sanitation in the Sub-Arctic areas of Siberia and Northern Russia. Again though most of their work was adapted to field operations, civil health officers serving in the Army have left behind them in such famous cities as Jerusalem and Baghdad improved standards of sanitation and permanent works, which will remain as a monument to their skill and energy for many years to come.
It was not possible for every medical officer of health to abandon his post at home, but those remaining in civil life did much to promote and safeguard the health of thq troops in training. In all parts of the United Kingdom, county, borough, and district, medical officers of health have readily assisted the Army in regard to billets, camp sites, water supplies and other matters where their local knowledge was invaluable. In the industrial areas they have been equally active in regard to the health of munition workers. The importance of preventive measures in connexion with infectious and contagious diseases at a time when troops and civilians were in constant movement from one part of the country to another, need not be emphasized.
COMMAND CONDITIONS IN THE ARMY.
We labour under a difficulty in the Army, especially a hastily organized Army such as our recent one, and that is that enormous numbers of men, many of whom have previously lived in sparsely populated districts are suddenly brought under communal conditions and live in close proximity to each other. Such men are mnanifestly especially prone to contract communicable disease. We have, however, the immense advantages of facilities as regards education and discipline; having proved that our measures and recommendations are sound we can teach these principles, and we can then employ disciplinary means to ensure their enaction. As you know, enteric inoculation is voluntary and not compulsory in our Army. I well remember how, in 1914, our endeavours to make the men understand the advisability of inoculation, and to persuade them to undergo the process were invariably met by the production of the page of a certain daily journal which strongly advised against inoculation. I think it says something for the persuasive powers of our eloquence and for the intelligence of the British soldier that we were able to overcome this most pernicious advice, and that 96 per cent. of our Army were inoculated against the disease.
WATER SUPPLY AND WATER PURIFICATION.
There are many questions such as the details of army sanitary organization, sanitary sections, mobile laboratories, conservancy, &C., into which I should like to enter did time permit. I think, however, that it might be of interest if I very briefly discussed the question of water supply and water purification, these being points of such vital importance to armies in the field.
The provision of a pure water supply to troops is of paramount importance with regard to the prevention of those intestinal diseases which have proved so fatal to armies in-the,past. In most theatres of war, the sources of water have mainly been shallow wells, generally ginssly polluted. Our practice has been to regard all water as probably contaminated and to deal with it accordingly, and this attitude has been justified in all theatres of war by laboratory analysis. In exceptional instances municipal supplies or deep wells have been available, but the risk of contamination during collection and distribution justifies the army method of treatment of water even in these exceptional cases.
As the size of the arnaies increased, the question of the provision of an adequate water supply, especially during the summer months, became an urgent one, and resulted in our developing an extensive organization. This organization included the whole question of supply, the sinking of bore holes, the improvement of existing or damaged wells, and, the distribution by pipe lines leading to central " water points." These " water points" usually consisted of a series of large tanks placed close to main roads, and from them pure -water was provided to the units in those areas. In many cases water was laid close up to, or even actually into, the trenches; in other cases the final distribution to the trenches was by hand carriage in petrol tins.
In Eastern theatres the semifinal stage of transport was carried out by mule or camel transport. In France difficulties arose-as may be readily imagined-during and immediately after an advance. In such instances many thousands of troops moved rapidly forward into areas where all supplies of water had been destroyed. The work carried out by the Royal. Engineers in rapidly carrying forward the piped system was really amazing, but it -Was impossible even for the Royal Engineers to carry out the 'work with sufficient rapidity in all instances, and consequently certain new units were developed, namely, the water tanlk companies and water barges to meet the necessity.
The water tank companies comprised a number of motor lorries specially adapted and staffed, and these units were able rapidly to transport water from any convenient source to the troops by any available roads, and to deliver sterile water to the troops at the rate of, e.g., 1,200 gallons per hour. The water barges could carry water at the rate of 5,000 gallons per hour over the many available canals and rivers in Northern France and Belgium. In both instances the water was so treated as to render it fre.e from protozoal., bacterial and chemically poisonous matters. The system of treatpaent ;w4s based on a primary alum and sand filtration followed by contact with eclorine gas for half an hour, and then dechlorination in order to remove objectionable taste before final delivery to the troops in a sterile condition.
For scientific control, both bacteriological and chemical,. thee various mobile laboratories were responsible, and routine eitamination of all waters in the war zones were carried out. For general use and for the information of medical officers of individual units the Horrocks test outfit was generally supplied, and proved both simple and efficacious.
To meet the case of the individual soldier who might be separated from his unit, tablets of acid sodium sulphate were supplied, these tablets being made up in such a strength as effectively to sterilize the contents of the quart water bottle carried by each soldier, these water bottles being lined with a special enamel.
You will understand from the above that a vast amount of thought and careful work was expended in the provision of a pure water supply to the troops, and to this work we must credit in no small measure the satisfactory absence of such diseases as would ordinarily be conveyed by a contaminated water supply.
As regards our sanitary organization, I think we may say that it has stood the crucial test of the recent war remarkably well, and it has recently undergone, and is still undergoing, certain modifications which will, I believe, render it even more efficient in the future. HYGIENE AND PATHOLOGY HAND IN HAND.
If the three desiderata of education, organization and discipline be carried out steadily anid intelligently, we may, I hope, regard ourselves as leading in the methods of safeguarding our armies from disease. Education must be carried out steadily and unceasingly by every medical officer in the Army; army sanitary organization, for which we owe so much in the recent war to Sir William Horrocks, will be safe in the hands of his successors, and it should never be forgotten that hygiene and pathology must go hand in hand. Each is so closelv connected with and dependent upon the other, that without the close cooperation of both our methods and organization would break down.
I should like most sincerely to acknowledge my indebtedness and my gratitude to those officers, more especially General Beveridge and Colonels Harvey, Smales, and Cummins, who have furnished me with many of the data fr6m which I have compiled this brief paper. I must apologize for its shortcomings and omissions but, as I stated at the commencement, the subject is so extensive that I found it somewhat difficult to deal with even the principal points in one brief paper.
DISCUSSION.
The PRESIDENT, after thanking Sir John Goodwin, said that the extraordinarily small amount of preventive disease in the Army in France was often a source of wonder and admiration to those who were serving in the Grand Fleet.
Sir HUMPHRY ROLLESTON, alluding to the elaborate precautions which were taken to prevent the spread of infectious disease, such as dysentery, from returned troops to the civil population, asked Sir John Goodwin if he could explain how it was that disease was not spread by the returning troops after the South African War ?
Lieutenant-Colonel W. R. BATTYE, D.S.O., I.M.S.: Sir John Goodwin stated that he would not quote comparative figures of sick to wounded in this and former wars, because he thought we were liable to overlook the relatively larger number of casualties produced by the newer weapons of warfare in this last war. There is a popular book written by an American medical man, which has been widely read and favourably reviewed in some of our leading papers. In it the author states that whereas in former wars the proportion of sick to wounded was usually five or more to one, yet in this war this figure has been trebly reversed, and has been as one to fifteen! And this too in spite of the fact that the proportion of battle casualties to total troops engaged has been smaller in this than in previous wars. This is a startling statement, and I should like to know if Sir John Goodwin can throw any light on it. Sir John Goodwin also referred to the excellent work of civil medical officers of health and other civil sanitarians in the Army, and the effect that the sanitary work of these officers has had on the civil population in various places, and incidentally he mentioned Baghdad. As I have recently returned from Mesopotamia and have been closely connected as an administrative officer with the work done in the city of Baghdad and other parts of Mesopotamia, I can bear personal testimony to the excellent educational value of the Army's work on the civil population. The work in Baghdad has been largely organized by an officer who in peace time was a medical officer of health of a large county area in England, and now he is back in his old appointment. The work was organized on the lines of that in a large English town, and in some respects was, I think, actually in advance of that in English towns. Soon after Baghdad was first occupied by British troops and a sanitary section installed there, some of the leading priests of some of the large mosques made application for the sanitation of their mosques to be reported on and supervised by our sanitary officers. The request was acceded to, and from that day the British Tommy has access as a sanitary inspector to several of the mosques of Baghdad. To all who know the Mohammedan East, this will undoubtedly be recognized as a triumph, the credit for which is due to the Army, whose work Sir John Goodwin has been representing here to-night.
Colonel WILLIAM HUNTER spoke of the incidence of infectious disease, particularly typhoid and paratyphoid fevers among the troops in the Dardanelles, and gave illustrative statistics.
Major-General Sir WILLIAM MACPHERSON, in reply to a request from Sir John Goodwin, gave some statistics regarding the relative incidence of wounds and disease among the troops in France, and pointed out that the relation between the numbers of casualties from wounds and those due to disease depended upon the number of battles which were fought.
Sir JOHN GOODWIN, in replying to the various points raised in the discussion, and particularly to the point raised by Sir Humphry Rolleston, said that probably the length of the voyage from South Africa, which occupied some time, and the fact that men were retained for a longer period in hospital accounted for the non-spread of infectious disease after the South African War.
APPENDIX.
-Notes on Casualties in Campaiqns, sutpplied by Major-General Sir William Mllacpherson, K.C.M.G., C.B. I do not know what Amnerican publication has been referred to but it appears to be hopelessly wrong, if it says that the deaths from wounds were three times less in this war than in any previous war in proportion to strength. I have just been reading a German publication (one of Bodart's, the Austrian, who has written pre-war books on losses in war) in which these very points are gone into. Bodart exaggerates the strength of the British, putting it down as 7,000,000 for combatants, whereas our highest strength at any time in all theatres of operations was only 2,834,690, and in France alone 2,044,627. Bodart's figures of casualties are much nearer the mark, and even with his exaggerated statement. of strength in the field, he shows that killed is 15 per cent. of strength (it would be very much higher with the corrected lower strength), as compared with 10 per cent in the Russo-Japanese war, 6'7 per cent. in the Russo-Turkish, 3'6 per cent. in the Franco-German, 2-55 per cent. in the 1866 war, 5'45 per cent. in the Crimean war, 7 8 per cent. in the Napoleonic wars. Also he says that on an average of every day of the 1,532 days of the war, 6,046 deaths occurred, as compared with 1,950 in the Balkan wars of 1912-13, 319 in the Russo-Japanese, 930 in Franco-German, and 400 in the Crimea. (These figures are for all armies engaged, as are also the figures of percentage of killed to strength; not for British only.) The point the speaker, or his American authority, seems to have got hold of is that the percentage of case-mortality amongst the wounded in the last war was very low as compared with previous wars-i.e., 10 per cent. as compared with 39 per cent. in Crimea, 32 per cent. in the Russo-Turkish, 25 per' cent. in Franco-German, and 19 per cent. in Russo-Japanese wars. The maximum strength in any one day in France was 2,044,627, including Colonials and Indians, but not labour units. The total killed or died of wounds to end of 1917 was 412,955. As the maximum strength greatly exceeds average strength, the proportion of killed and died of wounds, amounting to over 20 per cent., would be still higher if calculated on average strength, and is practically three times greater instead of three times less than in any previous war, except the Russo-Japanese War, where, according to Bodart, the percentage was ten.
